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Abstract: Similarity-based cognition is commonplace. It occurs whenever an 
agent or system exploits the similarities that hold between two or more items 
— e.g., events, processes, objects, and so on— in order to perform some 
cognitive task. This kind of cognition is of special interest to cognitive 
neuroscientists. This paper explicates how similarity-based cognition can be 
understood through the lens of radical enactivism and why doing so has 
advantages over its representationalist rival, which posits the existence of 
structural representations or S-representations. Specifically, it is argued that 
there are problems both with accounting for the content of S-representations 
and with understanding how neurally-based structural similarities can work as 
representations (even if contentless) in guiding intelligent behavior. Finally, 
with these clarifications in place, it is revealed how radically enactivism can 
commit to an account of similarity-based cognition in its understanding of 
neurodynamics.  
 
Keywords: similarity-based cognition; cognitive neuroscience; radical 





Similarity-based cognition occurs whenever an agent or system exploits the 
similarities that hold between two or more items — e.g., events, processes, 
objects, and so on— in order to perform some cognitive task. It has been 
proposed that conceiving of representations in terms of structural similarities 
provides new resources to overcome traditional puzzles that have plagued 
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other representational theories of cognition. With respect to the explanatory 
needs of cognitive neuroscience, many philosophers maintain that appealing to 
similarity-based forms of cognition is the most promising strategy for building 
an adequate representational theory of mind (O’Brien 2015a, 2015b; 
Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 2017; Williams 2017; Ramsey 2018; Shea 2018; Lee 
2018).  
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it challenges the two main 
strategies that motivate conceiving neurally-based structural similarities of 
interest to cognitive neuroscience as mental representations. Second, once this 
clarification is made, the paper explicates how neurally-based structural 
similarities can play a part in explaining intelligent behaviour within a radically 
enactive and embodied account of cognition. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 introduces the notion of 
similarity-based cognition, showing how it is cashed out in cognitive 
neuroscience. It focuses on the well-known example of place cells in rats’ 
hippocampus. Section 2 introduces the arguments in favor of the idea that 
neurally-based structural similarities should be conceived of as contentful 
structural or S-representations. Section 3 problematizes those arguments, 
showing that we have yet to be supplied reasons for thinking that structural 
similarities – those that purportedly do explanatory work in cognitive 
neuroscience – are contentful. It is argued that defenders of S-representational 
interpretation of structural similarities presuppose, but do not explain, the 
origin of the contentful properties of structural similarities. If this analysis holds 
good, despite claims to the contrary, S-representations fail to answer the job 
description challenge. Section 4 examines a less demanding reason for thinking 
that neurally-based structural similarities should be conceived of as S-
representations. Putting aside questions about content, some argue that the 
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alleged fact that structural similarities are exploited by brains in a way that is 
analogous to the ways cognitive agents exploit models or maps suffices to 
establish the representational status of structural similarities. New empirical 
findings concerning the future-oriented activity of place cells are called upon 
to justify this position. Against this view, it is argued that these empirical 
findings provide no support for the claim that place cells are used in anything 
like route-planning or surrogative reasoning. It follows that if there is no robust, 
non-metaphorical sense in which the brain uses structural similarities as 
models or maps this inferential path to the conclusion that structural 
similarities have representational status is blocked. Finally, section 5 explicates 
how similarity-based cognition can be understood under the auspices of a 
radical enactive, non-representational conception of cognition.  
 
1. Similarity-Based Cognition in Cognitive Neuroscience 
Similarity-based cognition, SBC, is commonplace. It occurs whenever an agent 
exploits relations of similarity holding between two or more items — e.g., 
events, processes, objects, and so on — in order to perform a cognitive task 
(Cummins 1994; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Ramsey 2018).  
Everyday examples of SBC include navigating to a location by using a 
cartographic map or using a mercury thermometer to discover the current 
temperature of a room. In such cases, similarities between items are exploited 
by cognitive agents when they treat one item, X, as a surrogate or stand in for a 
target item, Y, and when doing so reliably guides behaviour with respect to the 
target item. 1  Behaviour is understood broadly here as to include an agent 
making embodied responses, taking particular actions, making reliable 
judgements or inferences, and explicitly deciding on courses of actions.  
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Many philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists assume that fundamental 
varieties of cognition are similarity-based (Shagrir 2012; Jacobson 2015; 
Kriegestkorte and Kievit 2013; Sachs 2018; Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 2017, 
Williams and Collings 2017; Shea 2018). The guiding hypothesis, when SBC is 
pitched at the neural level, is that neural states make a causal contribution to 
the processes that drive the behaviour of cognitive systems towards some target 
items in virtue of the fact that certain similarities hold between the neural states 
and those target items. Call this “neurally-based SBC.” 
A thing can be similar to another in many ways, nonetheless. One item may 
be similar to another simply by having shared colour, mass, charge, and so on. 
However, neural items do not enable cognitive work to get done by possessing 
just any kind of similarities with their distal targets. Rather, the similarities at 
issue are thought to be of a second-order or structural kind.  
O’Brien and Opie (2004) explicate what structural similarity means in the 
following terms:  
We will say that one system structurally resembles another when the physical 
relations among the objects that comprise the first preserve some aspects of 
the relational organization of the objects that comprise the second. (pp. 14-
15, emphasis original) 
Cartographic maps, for example, rely on structural similarities. A 
cartographic map of Sydney can help us to get around a specific location of the 
city just in case its relevant constituents (lines, figures, symbols, and so on) are 
arranged in a way that systematically mirrors the topographic and metrical 
relations that hold among the relevant constituents (buildings, streets, and so 
on) of the city of Sydney. This structure-preserving mapping relationship 
holding between the constituents of both systems, the map, and the city, 
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guarantees that specific points on the map correspond to specific locations in 
the city. The same reasoning applies to mercury thermometers. Mercury 
thermometers inform us about the temperature of a particular room just in case 
the variations in the height of the liquid column correspond to orderly 
variations in the temperature of that room.  
When applied to the domain of cognitive neuroscience, the idea is that neural 
items can play a causal part in enabling the achievement of a cognitive task in 
virtue of the fact such neural items mirror relevant structural properties of some 
target domain.2 Accordingly, whether the cognitive task can be successfully 
achieved depends, at least in part, on the degree to which the neural item at 
issue structurally mirrors the relevant target domain.  
For cognitive neuroscientists, neurally-based SBC can be called upon to 
explain a vast array of cognitive phenomena – including visual perception, 
motor control, memory, imagination. In recent years, the remarkable potential 
of such explanations has become evident with the advent of predictive 
processing accounts of cognition — those which assume that the best and most 
unified explanations of cognitive phenomena need to posit generative models 
operating across multiple scales and levels (Clark 2016; Gładziejewski 2016; 
Williams 2017; Sachs 2018). 
Neurally-based SBC is most famously invoked in explanations of rodent 
spatial navigation (see Bechtel 2016; Shea 2018). Years after Tolman 
hypothesized the existence of a “cognitive map” to explain spatial navigation 
in mammals (Tolman 1948), researchers discovered that individual neurons 
allocated into regions DG, CA1 and CA3 of the rats’ hippocampus fire “solely 
or maximally when the rat was situated in a particular part of the testing 
platform facing in a particular direction” (O’Keefe and Dostrovsky 1971, p. 
172). Follow-up studies by O’Keefe (1976) and O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) also 
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showed that neurons in the CA1 region respond primarily to location, with 
some of them—20 out of the 26 firstly reported—firing when the rats occupy or 
run past the appropriate location. Scientists called the hippocampal neurons 
involved in navigation tasks “place cells.”  
The current scientific consensus assumes that place cells within the rats’ 
hippocampus play a causal role in enabling navigation tasks — namely, finding 
shortcuts towards a food source — because they are structurally similar to the 
environment. More precisely, it has been discovered that the patterns of co-
activation relationships between the cells (roughly, their tendency to show joint 
activity) mirror the structure of metric relations among different relevant 
locations within the environment (Bechtel 2016; Knierim 2015; Pfeiffer and 
Foster 2013). Accordingly, the structure-preserving mapping relationship 
holding between the activation profile of the place cells and the spatial layout 
of the environment contributes to explaining the capability of rats to 
successfully navigate the environment, even in complete darkness. 
Given this, place cells are taken to be the realizers of the cognitive map 
previously hypothesized by Tolman (Schmidt and Redish, 2013). For example, 
it has been claimed that the whole system of place cells provides other parts of 
the rats’ brains with “an internal map of the spatial layout of the environment, 
encoded in a Cartesian coordinate system” (Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 2017, 
p. 344; O’Keefe and Dostrovsky 1971, p. 174).3  In the same vein, Ramsey (2016) 
holds that place cells function “as component parts of an encoded map of the 
environment that the rat is trying to navigate. They … are serving as 
surrogative stand-ins within a broader map-like neural structure” (p. 9). 
 
2. The Case for Structural Representations 
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For many, the very existence of causally potent structural similarities at the 
neural level entails the existence of a special kind of mental representation. 
Proponents of this idea call these mental representations “structural” or “S-
representations.” 
As canonically described, S-representations can be conceived of as 
components of larger cognitive mechanisms – where such mechanisms are 
partly individuated by reference to the function they perform. Imagine a 
mechanism M which is responsible for cognitive function F. M is an S-
representational system if its ability to perform F causally depends on the fact 
that at least one of its components R is structurally similar to some target 
domain T.4 If that is the case, M can fail to perform F if R is not sufficiently 
structurally similar to T; and, analogously, if M succeeds in bringing about F, it 
is in part due to the fact that R is sufficiently structurally similar to T.5 
Nonetheless, despite the popularity and promise of S-representations in 
cognitive neuroscience, if such neural items are to count as bona fide cognitive 
representations, they must face up to the “job description challenge” (Ramsey 
2007). 6  According to this challenge, if something is to count as a cognitive 
representation it must satisfy two conditions.   
First, it has to be shown that the structure in question possesses content such 
that it refers, denotes or depicts something else as being a certain way. 7 
Canonically, a cognitive state or structure bears representational content if and 
only if it has conditions of satisfaction of a special sort – namely if it is 
susceptible to being true or false, veridical or non-veridical, right or wrong, and 
so on (Neander 2017; Shea 2018; Lee 2018). Moreover, the class of realistic 
theories of mental representation we are considering takes the content of such 
representations to be inherent — this is, not supplied by external attributions.  
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Second, it must be shown how this structure plays a causal role in cognition 
in virtue of its content.8 This is because, as Sprevak (2011) reminds us, if content 
“is just along for the ride, and does no causal or explanatory work, then there 
seems no reason to assume that the state in question is specifically 
representational, rather than, say, a causal relay with the same effects” (p. 670). 
As such, nothing will be a mental representation if it does not play a distinctive 
causal-explanatory role in cognition in virtue of its content. This is a pivotal 
point, for having content is what distinguishes mental representations from 
other states that can also causally contribute to bringing about cognitive 
activity. 
It is claimed that S-representations can answer the job description challenge. 
Even Ramsey (2018), who originally issued the challenge, tells us that S-
representations will form “an essential part” of our best representational-cum-
computational accounts of cognition (p. 269, see also Opie and O’Brien 2015; 
Williams and Colling 2018; Lee 2018). Likewise, Piccinini (2018) observes that 
there is “an emerging consensus that the best way to understand representation 
in the context of cognitive explanation is structural” (p. 5). 
What, apparently, makes S-representations fit for such special theoretical 
duty? Why do so many theorists think that S-representations manage to answer 
the job-description challenge while all other theories of mental representation 
fail? Allegedly, S-representations have unique properties, and, in 
understanding them, it becomes evident how such mental representations have 
inherent content and how those contents can play a genuinely causal role in 
driving cognition.  
The favoured position in the literature is that S-representational vehicles “are 
contentful in virtue of resembling their represented objects” (O’Brien 2015a, p. 
9). Defenders of S-representations claim that structural similarities “ground” 
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mental representational content (O’Brien and Opie 2004, p. 6, 8-14; O’Brien 
2015a, p. 10). Following Von Eckardt (1993), this means that structural 
similarities are taken to be the “set of properties or relations that determine the 
semantic properties in question” (p. 199).  
The rationale is as follows. The properties of a given S-representational 
vehicle, R, cause it to be structurally similar to some target state of affairs, T. 
Because R can mirror the structure of T more or less accurately, structural 
similarity entails accuracy conditions. Accuracy conditions are taken to entail 
content. Therefore, structural similarity is taken to entail content. Thus, S-
representationalists conclude, the fact that R structurally mirrors T entails that 
R contentfully represents T. 
According to this line of reasoning, the contentful properties of S-
representations are supplied by the vehicular properties that make them 
structurally similar to their targets. If this is right, the contents of S-
representations, unlike the contents of symbolic representations, are inherently 
and non-arbitrarily related to the properties of their vehicles (Williams 2017; 
Lee 2018). 
Moreover, since it is assumed that such structural similarity is causally 
relevant for the success or failure of a given cognitive function, if structural 
similarity entails content then it follows that cognitive systems whose behavior 
is causally guided by the structural similarities holding between its S-
representational vehicles and their targets are cognitive systems whose 
behavior is causally guided by mental representational contents. 
Representational contents fixed by structural similarities are, according to S-
representationalists, unproblematically causally potent of cognition.9 
With this in mind, O’Brien and Opie (2010) tell us that cognitive processes 
that involve S-representations: 
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are driven by the very properties that determine the content of its vehicles. 
In this sense, an [S-representational system] is not a mere semblance of a 
semantic engine—it’s the real thing. Any organism whose inner processes are 
analog in nature is causally indebted to the semantic properties of its inner states (p. 
127, emphasis added). 
Thus, according to their defenders, S-representations are not only consistent 
with what we know about cognitive neuroscience, but they are better equipped 
to solve the classical challenges faced by other representational theories in 
cognitive science. In light of this, S-representations have been invoked in 
virtually every area of cognitive science, including classic symbolic 
computation (Gallistel 1990; Gallistel and King 2009), connectionism (O’Brien 
and Opie 2006, 2009), and predictive coding (Gładziejewski 2016; Kiefer and 




3. The Case Against Structural Representations 
A standard, first-pass objection to S-representational theories of mental 
representation is that, even if we accept all that has been said so far, any content 
an S-representation might have is indeterminate.10  
To see this, consider, again, cartographic maps — the paradigm example of 
non-mental S-representations. A map might be said to contentfully represent 
Sydney if the metrical relations among its constituent elements mirror the 
metrical relations between the relevant features of Sydney. Yet it can be the case 
that the very same map mirrors, perhaps to a different degree, the spatial layout 
of New York City as well. If that is the case, it would seem that S-
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representationalists have to say that the same map represents both Sydney and 
New York City. Simply put, if the representational content of a map is wholly 
and uniquely determined by what it structurally mirrors, then what it 
represents, assuming it represents at all, is indeterminate. 
Two main solutions to this content-specificity problem have been offered in 
the literature. The first solution proposes that the content of an S-representation 
is fixed, not only by what is being mirrored, but by whatever the S-
representation targets when it is used to guide cognitive activity.  Here we can 
assume, along with Godfrey-Smith (2006), that “[t]he target of a map is just 
whatever the map is in fact used to deal with” (p. 58).11 The second solution, 
instead, proposes that S-representational contents get determined etiologically 
– that is, by what they were selected for dealing within the history of the 
cognitive agent’s engagements.12 
We should not be distracted by these possibilities. A much stronger objection 
to S-representations focuses not on what makes the putative content of 
structural similarities determinate, but on whether structural similarities have 
any inherent content at all. Ultimately, the S-representationalist package is only 
tenable if it can account for the source of S-representational contents. In other 
words, what is required is a naturalistic account of the representational content 
of S-representations. 
Recall that to be a structural representation, “a state must belong to a system 
of states that bear a second-order [structural] similarity to their targets … and 
the states must guide action based on their similarity to their target” (Piccinini 
2018, p. 3). We are also told that “when a system’s internal states satisfy [the 
above conditions] they qualify as representations in a robust sense, which 
possess semantic content by the lights of a naturalistic theory of semantic 
content” (Piccinini 2018, p. 3). 
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Yet, the pivotal question for S-representationalists is whether the holding of 
structural similarity relations – on their own – suffices for one state of affairs to 
specify, refer or describe something about another state of affairs in a way that 
can be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, veridical or non-veridical. In other 
words, whether the fact that a particular item structurally mirrors another item 
suffices for the former to contentfully represent the latter.  
On close examination, we contend, even though structural similarities might 
be said to ground content in the sense of enabling contentful evaluations and 
inferences, there is no reason to believe that such structural similarities, in-an-
of-themselves, are inherently contentful.  
Consider the following case. Against the backdrop of certain practices, we 
can use variations in the level of the tides in a particular region to make 
inferences and say something true or false, for example, about changes in the 
position of the Moon relative to the Earth. In any particular case, attending to 
the level of tides may or may not be an accurate or reliable way of keeping track 
of or saying something true about the position of the moon. The same goes for 
the way we use variations in the height of the liquid column of a mercury 
thermometer to make inferences about changes in the ambient temperature of 
the room. In both cases, certain structural correspondences or similarities must 
hold for the claims to be true and the inferences valid. This is so even though 
there is no reason to suppose that the structural correspondences in question 
must, themselves, represent things accurately or inaccurately. 
In other words, it does not follow from the fact that we can make truth-
evaluable claims based on structural similarities holding between two items, A 
and B, that A contentfully represents something that might be true or false 
about B. It is thus logically confused to suppose that the correspondences or 
structural similarities in question must be contentful in order for us to rely on 
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them in ways that make it possible to be right or wrong about things 
contentfully.  
Following Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017), we can imagine a cognitive 
agent whose behavior is endogenously controlled by a mechanism that is 
sensitive to the fact that some internal states of the agent change concurrently 
with changes in the external environment. In such a scenario, we agree that a 
promising way to explain how the agent manages to cope with the environment 
“is to point to the [structural] similarity between its internal processes and the 
processes in the environment” (Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 2017, p. 351). We 
disagree, however, that this would be a case in which the behavior of the agent 
is causally guided by representational content. Again, this is because we have 
no reason to believe that structural similarities that meet the stated conditions 
suffice for mental representations with contentful properties. The mere fact that 
structural similarities can play a causal role in enabling successful acts of 
cognition does nothing to establish that structural similarities are contentful. 
So far, we have been given no reason to suppose that structural similarities 
are sufficient for or entail content (see Goodman 1968, Fodor 1987, Hutto 2008 
for similar claims). If structural similarities do not suffice for or entail content, 
then a fortiori they do not get their cognitive work done in virtue of possessing 
content.  
In this light, if S-representationalists hope to meet the job description 
challenge they must do more than simply presuppose that neurally-based 
structural similarities are contentful; they must explain how and why structural 
similarities are contentful. To answer this, in essence, requires answering the 
general challenge posed by the Hard Problem of Content, or HPC, articulated 
by radical enactivists (Hutto and Myin 2013). What is needed is a substantial 
theory that accounts for S-representational content. 
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One option, at this point, is to attempt to explain S-representational content 
by appeal to some further theory of mental representational content. Most 
philosophers turn to teleosemantics to do this crucial work. For example, 
Thomson and Piccinini (2018) tell us that teleosemantics is “the best-developed 
and most plausible theory of representational content in biological systems” (p. 
194). 
Yet teleosemantics faces well-known shortcomings (Stich 1990; Fodor 1990; 
Rosenberg 2015; Burge 2010, Hutto and Myin 2013; Hutto and Satne 2015). To 
use a familiar example, whereas teleosemantics can explain why frogs snap 
their tongues in presence of black dots, it lacks the resources to specify, 
unequivocally, whether the frog’s visual system represents them as “black 
dots,” “flies,” “food,” and so on. Thus, even though teleosemantics provides 
the required resources to explain how organisms come to systematically target 
certain aspects of the world and not others, it fails to deliver a robust theory of 
representational content according to which entities are picked out 
intensionally or under a description. 
We will not rehearse those arguments again here. Instead, we will assess 
Lee’s (2018) attempt to address those concerns afresh and head-on. Concurring 
with the above analysis, Lee (2018) holds that existing S-representational 
accounts have only “touched upon the issue of how to think about content” (p. 
2). In an attempt to do better on this score, he aims to “show in detail how we 
can provide a naturalised understanding of content that dispels the strongest 
accusations of the antirepresentationalist” (p. 2). 
Along with other defenders of S-representations, Lee (2018) holds that 
structural similarities are “what underwrites the representation’s degree of 
accuracy (its ‘accuracy value’)” (p. 2). But this, again, is insufficient to show that 
S-representations have content. Notably, Lee acknowledges that 
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correspondences of the sort structural similarities embody do not explain the 
source of representational content. He agrees that answering the HPC requires 
providing an account of S-representational content that does not rely solely on 
the notion of information-as-covariance. 
At this juncture, Lee looks to the notion of non-natural information as a 
promising way to address the HPC since, arguably, this notion allows for the 
possibility of misrepresentation.13 He tells us that: 
a non-natural information bearer is distinct from a natural information 
bearer in that it is both potentially decouplable from the conditions it bears 
information about, and the conditions it bears information about may be 
false. Yet both intuitively, and implicitly within the practice of cognitive 
science, non-natural information remains ‘informative’ (p. 9). 
But, ultimately, Lee’s (2018) strategy falls short of providing a straight 
answer to the HPC. This is so because, as he admits, in these debates “there is 
no adequate theory which justifies the presence of non-natural information” (p. 
10).  
In the end, instead of answering the HPC, Lee (2018) argues that 
considerations about the explanatory role of non-natural information in 
cognitive science give us reason to question the legitimacy of what the HPC 
demands. As he holds, faced with a choice between recognizing the centrality 
of non-natural information to explanations of cognitive neuroscience or the 
need to answer the HPC, we should question “the severity of the HPC” (p. 10). 
In sum, rather than explaining how S-representations can have content, Lee 
(2018) motivates acceptance that they do so by focusing on the explanatory 
work allegedly achieved by S-representational contents. As he argues, given 
 17 
the kind of explanatory work earmarked for S-representations, we are 
warranted in assuming that S-representations have content.  
Specifically, Lee (2018) holds that if S-representations are involved in error-
detection work then we are justified, in light of explanatory need, in assuming 
that they are contentful. Why so? In his own words: 
If one’s theory of a system features an S-representation with a feedback 
component, whereby the system adjusts its behaviour based on a mismatch 
between an S-representation and some feature of a task, then this mismatch 
… provides further justification for thinking that error, therefore accuracy 
conditions (therefore content), contributes to our understanding of how the 
mechanism works. (p. 12) 
The important thing to notice is that not all mismatches entail 
representational errors. In fact, a key claim of radical enactivism (Hutto and 
Myin 2013, 2017) is that it is possible for some cognitive activities of agents to 
be “pragmatically mis-aligned, insensitive to certain features of the 
environment in a way that causes their efforts to fail” (Roelofs 2018, p. 246). 
Therefore, when explaining why such cognitive activities go wrong it would be 
a mistake to assume that cognitive systems must always go wrong by 
representing things wrongly. This is true even in those cases in which a 
pragmatic misalignment is brought about by a failure of a system’s internal 
structures to mirror those of some target sufficiently well (see Kirchhoff and 
Robertston 2018). 
Moreover, a system may be sensitive to such failures and may respond by 
effecting a stronger match of its internal states to some target, thereby 
improving its chances of successful outcomes. Yet a system can do all of this 
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without any part of it specifying or contentfully representing that certain 
conditions hold. 
Imagine a set of keys, but only one of them can open a particular lock. Each 
key has its own unique geometry such that only one ‘fits’ the lock sufficiently 
well to open it. We can imagine a system designed to attempt to open the lock 
by using those keys. We can also imagine that the system is sensitive to the 
resistance of being unable to turn the key as a signal to try another key, and that 
it will continue with such a strategy – using one key after the another – until it 
succeeds.  
What this simple example shows is that it is possible to be sensitive and 
responsive to mismatches in the completing of tasks without having to 
contentfully represent such mismatches (see Miłkowski 2015 for additional 
examples). This being the case, it is possible to explain a system’s sensitivity to 
mismatches and its capacity to make corrective adjustments to them without 
calling on the notion of representational content. 
In conclusion, even if we accept that there is similarity-based cognition at the 
neural level, we argue that appealing to structural similarities provides no new 
resources for overcoming the hard problem of content – namely, that of 
accounting for the origins of content naturalistically – and, a fortiori, helping us 
to understand how such putative contents could possibly make a causal 
difference to cognition. At the same time, pace Lee (2018), we see no compelling 
reasons for believing that there is an indispensable explanatory need to posit 
the existence of such representational contents, even in the case of cognitive 
systems that are equipped with error-detection mechanisms. 
 
4. A Further Case Against Structural Representations 
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Might contentless structural similarities still play a causal-explanatory, and yet 
properly representational, role in cognitive science even if they are contentless?  
Some proponents of S-representations seem to think so.  
Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017) maintain that the new emphasis on the 
explanatory value of structural similarities in cognitive neuroscience affords 
“an opportunity to develop, strengthen, and indeed reform the mainstream 
understanding of what representations are” (2017, p. 338, emphasis added). For our 
purposes, the crucial adjustment would be to divorce the notion of mental 
representation from any and all connections with the notion of content. 14 
Others, such as Jacobson (2003, 2015), argue that no revision is needed. This is 
because, by her lights, the notion of content is a philosophical invention, and 
cognitive neuroscience has long been in the business of positing contentless 
representations.15 
How can we understand S-representations as contentless but nevertheless 
representational? What justifies thinking of such structural similarities as 
representations if we assume that they lack content?  
A familiar argument for this conclusion defends the idea that structural 
similarities function as maps or models in cognitive systems at the neural level. 
According to this view, since maps and models are primary examples of 
everyday non-mental representations, this gives us reason to regard neurally-
based structural similarities as paradigm mental representations.  
Ramsey (2016) articulates this view in the following terms: 
If we think of mental representations not as indicators but instead as 
something more like elements of maps, models or simulations, then we can 
at least get the outlines of a story about how a part of the brain could actually 
function in a representational manner. (p. 7) 
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Yet for this argument to have bite neurally-based structural similarities must 
be more than merely map-like or model-like. They must actually function as 
maps or models in cognition. Why so? The reason is obvious. Everything is 
map-like or model-like to some degree. Hence, without further qualification, it 
is trivial to satisfy this criterion. Consider that humans are protozoa-like, and 
vice versa in that both humans and protozoa have cells.   
So, the real question is: Are structural similarities actually exploited by a 
cognitive system or some part of it as models, maps, or surrogates of distal 
targets? Again, this question is important because, if they are, then there would 
be strong reasons to think, by analogy, that they are playing a bona fide 
representational role in cognition.  
Reasons have been given for thinking that neurally-based structural 
similarities should be thought of play the role of a map in cognition. For 
example, elaborating on the place cells, Ramsey (2016) maintains that: 
Insofar as these neural transformations implement a coordinate geometry 
during navigation that reflects the structure of the items and properties of 
the environment, it is perfectly natural and, more importantly, explanatorily 
beneficial to regard such a system as functioning as a map. Specific elements of 
the system are thus functioning as representations of features of the target 
domain (p. 8, emphases added). 
At this juncture, however, we must be careful not to conflate evidence that 
the neural structures in question have map-like properties with evidence that 
brains or cognitive systems are using such structures as maps.16 What needs to 
be shown is that the way the rat’s brain uses place cells in order to guide 
navigation is analogous, in a full-bodied sense, to the way agents use 
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cartographic maps. This is pivotal since, again, robustly satisfying the analogy 
is what, allegedly, secures that place cells are playing a representational role. 
Some philosophers argue that new empirical findings regarding place cells 
motivate thinking that the analogy with maps holds strongly in this case (see 
Gładziejewski 2015; Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 2017, Shea 2018). These 
empirical findings show that, in some circumstances, hippocampal neurons fire 
in advance of action. As Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017) argue, this 
evidence supplies a compelling reason to think that place cells are not only 
responsive to the current location of the animal but, rather, that they are used 
by the rats’ brains as surrogates to plan potential routes towards a target 
location.  
For example, after having recorded neural activity in the CA3 region of the 
hippocampus of rats engaging in decision tasks, Johnson and Redish (2007) 
discovered that many sequences of spikes, or “sweeps,” fired by place cells 
during theta oscillation correspond to locations ahead of the rat.  
For their experiment, they used two different mazes—one (called “multiple-
T maze”) consisting of four T choice points and another (called “cued-choice 
maze”) consisting of a single T turn. Both mazes had two return trails with two 
places providing reward food, but only the feeders on one side were providing 
food each day. In addition, different cue sounds were played before the final 
turn (the so-called “choice point”), indicating which side would provide 
reward on each trial.  
When rats reached the choice point, they faced a high-cost decision — taking 
the incorrect route means having to run approximately 3 m along the track 
before having another chance. Experimenters saw that, after being trained, rats 
often paused at the choice point, and that place cells corresponding to locations 
in both return trails fired while the individuals were standing still. Importantly, 
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the sweeps occurred separately — first for the cells corresponding to one side, 
and then the other — and they were not correlated to the orientation of the 
animal.  
In a more recent experiment, Pfeiffer and Foster (2013) used a 2m x 2m open-
field arena with 36 clearly demarcated locations. In the experimental task, rats 
had to alternatively forage for food rewards between randomly distributed 
locations and a stationary ‘home’ base. The location of the home base changed 
daily but remained constant within each day so that rats could remember it. 
Importantly, Pfeiffer and Foster (2013) found that in the moments when a rat 
paused before taking a journey, sequences of activity in place cells not only 
sweep ahead of it, but they transiently predict the journey that the animal is 
about to take.17 Like in the previous experiment, future-oriented sweeps were 
seen to be independent of the rat’s orientation. As they explain, these 
discoveries “reveal a flexible, goal-directed mechanism for the manipulation of 
previously acquired memories, in which behavioral trajectories to a 
remembered goal are depicted in the brain immediately before movement” 
(Pfeiffer and Foster 2013, p. 78). 
According to Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017), this body of empirical 
evidence reinforces the view that place cells are exploited in a way that is 
strongly analogous to the process of consulting a cartographic map. As they 
write: “the [hippocampal] map is internally manipulated [and] these 
manipulations are functional for the navigational mechanism in that they 
(presumably) serve as a basis for route planning” (p. 351). Likewise, Shea (2018) 
tells us that the evidence “suggests that rats use this prospective activity to plan 
the route they are about to follow” (p. 115). 
Yet, again, a note of caution is needed. The experiments show that place cells 
sometimes activate in a future-oriented manner, and that such activity is 
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strongly biased toward the satisfaction of a goal. Yet even if the future-oriented 
activity of place cells plays a part in explaining how rats navigate to a location, 
it does not follow that the process in question equates to or involves route 
planning.  
For this to be the case, forward sweeps would need to be involved in a 
process of evaluation so that they are used by other parts of the brain as 
surrogates of the available routes in order to choose the preferred one 
(Miłkowski 2015). This is something the experimenters themselves 
acknowledge: 
Nonlocal forward [sweeps] are not sufficient for the consideration of future 
possibilities. Such consideration processes would also require mechanisms 
for the evaluation of nonlocal [sweeps] as well as mechanisms for flexible 
translation into behavior. (Johnson and Redish 2007, p. 12184)  
The problem, however, is that it remains unclear whether, how and where 
this evaluation takes place. As Schmidt and Redish (2013) acknowledge, the 
hippocampus is thought to be part of a complex neural network that involves 
several brain structures, but it is unclear how the mentioned hippocampal 
activity interacts with the other brain structures in order to generate behavior. 
As they write, after these empirical findings “researchers must now explore 
what processes generate these place-cells sequences, and how they are used in 
recalculating the journey home” (p. 43; see also Pfeiffer and Foster 2013, p. 78).18 
Therefore, however ‘natural’ it may be to gloss what is going on in the rat’s 
brain as a map-using process, considering the current available evidence, we 
should not assume that the rat’s brain engages in any kind of planning by 
means of surrogative reasoning in these cases. There is no evidence available 
that the neural activity that drives behavior in response to place cell firings is 
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anything like the process of consulting a cartographic map in order to navigate 
a location and plan a route. We agree with Godfrey-Smith (2006) that:  
It is natural from the scientist’s point of view to say that the rat is using X 
[the structure of place cells] as a guide to Y [the maze], but as far as the 
mechanics of the situation are concerned, the ‘as guide to Y’ claim seems 
extraneous. (p. 51; see also Rosenberg, 2018, p. 138) 
Thus, without further evidence to show why we should think of these 
processes as robustly, and non-metaphorically, involving the use of a mental or 
cognitive map, we conclude that calling neurally-based structural similarities 
maps or models is unsupported. It follows that their representational status, in 
so far as it allegedly depends on they being used as models or maps, is 
unjustified. 
 
5. A Radical Enactive Take on SBC 
So far, we have argued that there is no reason to assume that the existence of 
causally potent neurally-based structural similarities entails the existence of 
mental representations. An important consequence of our analysis is that non-
representational accounts of cognition can embrace neurally-based SBC. In 
what follows, we briefly explore how neurally-based SBC might be construed 
under the auspices of one radical view of cognition – namely, the radical 
enactive account of cognition, or REC, advanced by Hutto and Myin (2013, 
2017). 
A signature idea of REC is that cognition does not always and everywhere 
involve or entail representational content. When engaged in perceptual-motor 
tasks, for example, REC proposes that organisms can detect, track, and interact 
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with salient aspects of the environment by sensing and responding to the 
covariant information available in it, but they need not internalize or represent 
such information.  
REC challenges the longstanding assumptions that the brain is either the seat 
of cognition or plays the chief role in enabling cognitive activity in virtue of 
neural states representing aspects of the environment. This, however, is not to 
deny that, at least for certain kinds of cognizers, neural activity plays a 
fundamental part in cognition, including basic forms of cognition. REC 
assumes that the primary function of dispositional patterns of neural excitation 
and inhibition is to coordinate the dynamically unfolding responses of 
organisms as they attune and adjust to environmental offerings in completing 
specific tasks (see also Engel et al. 2013; Gallagher 2017). We contend that 
adopting such a non-representational, action-oriented approach to 
neurodynamics is compatible with accepting that neurally-based structural 
similarities may play a pivotal role in explaining centrally important forms of 
intelligent and target-oriented behavior. 
In understanding the kind of work the brain does in cognition REC draws 
on Anderson’s theory of neural reuse (Anderson 2014). For Anderson, different 
parts of the central nervous system — at different scales, individual neurons, 
neural networks — are used and reused to accomplish different cognitive tasks. 
When this occurs, the various regions of the brain are temporarily soft-
assembled into functional units or systems. Accordingly, brains causally 
contribute to enabling intelligent behavior in a variety of circumstances by 
“putting [the same neural structures] together in different patterns of functional 
cooperation” (p. 5). 
Following Anderson’s theory, Hutto et al. (2017) have proposed that brains 
are fundamentally “protean.” The Protean Brain Hypothesis conjectures that 
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brain structures are functionally malleable and context-dependent. Brain-
involving cognitive systems, according to this hypothesis, make use of neural 
structures in inventive, on-the-fly improvisations to meet the system’s needs in 
specific circumstances.  
Importantly, for our purposes, the way neurally-based structural similarities 
help to explain certain instances of intelligent behavior can be understood in 
conjunction with neural reuse and the Protean Brain Hypothesis. Accordingly, 
the dynamic activity of the central nervous system can play a part in enabling 
intelligent behavior by temporally reconfiguring already existing neural 
structures in order to resemble specific aspects of relevant targets. This is a 
particular way of understanding how the dynamics of the central nervous 
system can make a causal contribution to the intelligent behaviour of cognitive 
systems without assuming that the brain is in the business of representing the 
external world. 
Crucially – focusing again on the parade case of place cells – the possibility 
that rat brains are using the forward-orientated firing of place cells for route 
planning is not the only available interpretation of the empirical evidence. 
Following Gallagher (2017), we contend that the fact that place cells fire in 
advance of action can be alternatively understood as “a constitutive part of the 
action itself, understood in diachronic, dynamical terms, rather than something 
decoupled from it” (Gallagher 2017, p. 14). On this view, anticipatory neural 
activity, operating on elementary timescales, can play a part in engendering 
larger-scale temporally extended cognitive activity (Stepp et al. 2011). 
Importantly, this can be the case even if the neural activity in question is not 
used by the rest of system as a separate process that fuels further distinct acts 




In this paper, we have challenged the popular suggestion that the existence of 
neurally-based SBC gives us reason to believe in S-representations. We offered 
two arguments against this view. 
First, we argued that there is no reason to suppose that structural similarities, 
in themselves, suffice for or entail content. Hence, there is no reason to think 
that structural similarities do their cognitive work in virtue of possessing 
contents. If so, then S-representations fail to answer the job description 
challenge.  
Second, we have also shown that there is no compelling evidence that 
neurally-based structural similarities function in a robust sense like maps when 
doing their cognitive work. Focusing on the parade case of place cells, we 
argued that the existing empirical evidence regarding the future-oriented 
activity of place cells does not provide compelling grounds for thinking that 
such neurally-based structural similarities are being used as maps, models, or 
surrogates of the external world.  
Putting all of this together, we conclude that there is no reason to assume 
that the existence of causally potent neurally-based structural similarities 
entails the existence of mental representations. Therefore, pace Thomson and 
Piccinini (2018), we should not infer from the fact that modern techniques in 
experimental neuroscience allow us to observe structural similarities doing 
causal work in cognition that we are observing S-representations in action.  
A crucial consequence of our analysis is that radical embodied, non-
representational accounts of cognition can embrace neurally-based SBC. We 
have defended this view in the context of REC and the Protean Brain 
Hypothesis (Hutto and Myin, 2013, 2017; Hutto et al. 2017). Importantly, going 
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radical on this score enables us to acknowledge the value the core machinery 
neurally-based SBC while characterizing it in more deflationary terms. It 
should be clear, however, that in challenging the representational status of SBC, 
and in taking a non-representational, action-oriented approach to 




Anderson, A. (2014). After phrenology. Neural reuse and the interactive brain. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
Bechtel, W. (2016). Investigating neural representations: The tale of place cells. 
Synthese, 193(5), 1287–1321.  
Burge, T. (2010). The origins of objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cummins, R. (1994). Interpretational semantics. In S. P. Stitch & T. A. Warfield (Eds.), 
Mental representation: A reader (pp. 297–298). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
Egan, F. (forthcoming). A deflationary account of mental representation. In J. 
Smortchkova, K. Dolega, & T. Schlicht (Eds.), What are mental representations? 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fodor, J. A. (1987). Psychosemantics. The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Fodor, J. A. (1990). A theory of content and other essays. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Gallagher, S. (2017). Enactivist interventions. Rethinking the mind. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Gallistel, C. R., & King, A. P. (2009). Memory and the computational brain: why cognitive 
science will transform neuroscience. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Garzón, F. C., & Rodríguez, Á. G. (2009). Where is Cognitive Science Heading? Minds 
and Machines, 19(3), 301–318. 
 29 
Gładziejewski, P. (2016). Predictive coding and representationalism. Synthese, 193(2), 
559–582. 
Gładziejewski, P., & Miłkowski, M. (2017). Structural representations: causally 
relevant and different from detectors. Biology & Philosophy, 32(3), 337–355.  
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2006). Mental representation, naturalism, and teleosemantics. In 
D. Papineau & G. MacDonald (Eds.), Teleosemantics: New philosophical essays (pp. 
42-68). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2009). Representationalism reconsidered. In D. Murphy & M. A. 
Bishop (Eds.), Stich and His Critics (pp. 30-46). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2012). Signals, Icons, and Beliefs. In D. Ryder, J. Kingsbury, & K. 
Williford (Eds.), Millikan and Her Critics (pp. 41–62). Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Goodman, N. (1968). Languages of art. London, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Hutto, D. D. (2008). Folk Psychological Narratives. The sociocultural basis of understanding 
reasons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism : Basic minds without content. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving enactivism: Basic minds meet content. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2018). Much ado about nothing? Why going non-semantic 
is not merely semantics. Philosophical Explorations, 21(2), 187–203.  
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (forthcoming). Deflating deflationism about mental 
representation. In J. Smortchkova, K. Dolega, & T. Schlicht (Eds.), What are mental 
representations? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hutto, D. D., Peeters, A., & Segundo-Ortin, M. (2017). Cognitive ontology in flux: the 
possibility of protean brains. Philosophical Explorations, 20(2), 209–223. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1312502 
Hutto, D. D., & Satne, G. (2015). The natural origins of content. Philosophia, 43(3), 521-
536. 
 30 
Jacobson, A. J. (2003). Mental representations: What philosophy leaves out and 
neuroscience puts in. Philosophical Psychology, 16(2), 189-203. 
Jacobson, A. J. (2015). Three concerns about the origins of content. Philosophia, 43(4), 
625-638. 
Johnson, A. & Redish, A. D. (2007). Neural ensembles in CA3 transiently encode 
paths forward of the animal at a decision point. The Journal of Neuroscience, 27(45), 
12176-12189. 
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Robertson, I. (2018). Enactivism and predictive processing: a non-
representational view. Philosophical Explorations, 21(2), 264-281. 
Knierim, J. J. (2015). From the GPS to HM: Place cells, grid cells, and memory. 
Hippocampus, 25, 719-725. 
Kriegeskorte, N., & Kievit, R. A. (2013). Representational geometry: integrating 
cognition, computation, and the brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(8), 401–412. 
Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought and other biological categories. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
Miłkowski, M. (2015). Satisfaction conditions in anticipatory mechanisms. Biology and 
Philosophy, 30, 709-728. 
Morgan, A. (2014). Representations gone mental. Synthese, 191(2), 213–244.  
Neander, K. (2017). A mark of the mental: In defense of informational teleosemantics. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Lee, J. (2018). Structural representations and the two problems of content. Mind & 
Language, 1-21. 
O’Brien, G. (2015a). How does mind matter? Solving the content causation problem. 
In T. K. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.), Open MIND. 
https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958570146 
O’Brien, G. (2015b). Rehabilitating resemblance redux. In T. K. Metzinger & J. M. 
Windt (Eds.), Open MIND. https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958571136 
 31 
O’Brien, G., & Opie, J. (2004). Notes toward a structuralist theory of mental 
representation. In H. Clapin, P. Staines, & P. Slezak (Eds.), Representation in mind 
(pp. 1–20). Oxford: Elsevier.  
O’Brien, G., & Opie, J. (2006). How do connectionist networks compute? Cognitive 
Processing, 7(1), 30–41.  
O’Brien, G., & Opie, J. (2009). The role of representation in computation. Cognitive 
Processing, 10(1), 53–62.  
O'Brien, G. & Opie, J. (2010). Representation in analog computation. In A. Newen, A. 
Bartels, & E. M. Jung (Eds.), Knowledge and representation (pp. 109-129). Stanford: 
CSLI Publications.  
O’Brien, G., & Opie, J. (2015). Intentionality lite or analog content? Philosophia, 43(3), 
723–729.  
O’Keefe, J. (1976). Place units in the hippocampus of the freely moving rat. 
Experimental Neurology, 51(1), 78–109. 
O’Keefe, J., & Dostrovsky, J. (1971). The hippocampus as a spatial map. Preliminary 
evidence from unit activity in the freely-moving rat. Brain Research, 34(1), 171–175. 
O’Keefe, John, & Nadel, L. (1978). The hippocampus as a cognitive map. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Piccinini, G. (2018). Computation and representation in cognitive neuroscience. 
Minds and Machines, 28(1), 1-6. 
Pfeiffer, B. E., & Foster, D. J. (2013). Hippocampal place-cells sequences depict future 
paths to remembered goals. Nature, 497(7447), 74-79. 
Ramsey, W. M. (2016). Untangling two questions about mental representation. New 
Ideas in Psychology, 40, 3–12.  
Ramsey, W. M. (2018). Maps, models and computational simulations in the mind. In 
M. Sprevak & M. Columbo (Eds.), Handbook of the Computational Mind. 
Rutledge (pp. 259-271).  
 32 
Ramsey, W. M. (forthcoming). Defending representational realism. In J. 
Smortchkova, K. Dolega, & T. Schlicht (Eds.), What are mental representations? 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Ramsey, W. M. (2007). Representation reconsidered. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rescorla, M. (2016). Bayesian sensorimotor psychology. Mind and Language, 31(1), 3-
36. 
Roelofs, L. (2018). Why imagining requires content: A reply to a reply to an objection 
to radical enactive cognition. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7(4), 246-254.  
Rosenberg, A. (2015). The genealogy of content or the future of an illusion. 
Philosophia, 43(3), 537-547. 
Rosenberg, A. (2018). How history gets things wrong: The neuroscience of our addiction to 
stories. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Sachs, C. B. (2018). In defense of picturing. Sellars's philosophy of mind and cognitive 
neuroscience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 
Schmidt, B., & Redish, A. D. (2013) Navigation with a cognitive map. Nature, 
497(7447), 42-43. 
Shagrir, O. (2012). Structural representations and the brain. The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 63(3), 519–545. 
Shea, N. (2013). Millikan’s Isomorphism Requirement. In D. Ryder, J. Kingsbury, & 
K. Williford (Eds.), Millikan and Her Critics. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Shea, N. (2014). Exploitable isomorphism and structural representation. Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society, 114, 123-144. 
Shea, N. (2018). Representation in cognitive science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sprevak, M. (2011). Review of William M. Ramsey. Representation reconsidered. The 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62(3), 669–675.  
Stepp, N., Chemero, A., & Turvey, M. T. (2011). Philosophy for the rest of cognitive 
science. Topics in Cognitive Science, 3, 425–437 
 33 
Swoyer, C. (1991). Structural representation and surrogative reasoning. Synthese, 87. 
449-508. 
Thomson, E., & Piccinini, G. (2018). Neural representations observed. Minds and 
Machines, 28(1), 191-235. 
Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychological Review, 55(4), 189–
208.  
Von Eckardt, B. (1993). What is cognitive science? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Williams, D. (2017). Predictive Processing and the Representation Wars. Minds and 
Machines. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-017-9441-6 
Williams, D., & Colling, L. (2017). From symbols to icons: the return of resemblance 




Acknowledgements: We would like to express our gratitude to the participants 
at the Neural Mechanisms Online Webinar Series (April 5th, 2019) for their 
useful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. Research 
for this article was supported by the Australian Research Council Discovery 
Project “Mind in Skilled Performance” (DP170102987). 
 
1  Swoyer (1991) illustrates this familiar phenomenon with the following example: “By 
examining the behavior of a scale model of an aircraft in a wind tunnel, we can draw 
conclusions about a newly designed wing’s response to wind shear, rather than 
trying it out on a Boeing 747 over Denver. By using numbers to represent the lengths 
of physical objects, we can represent facts about the objects numerically, perform 
calculations of various sorts, then translate the results back into a conclusion about 
the original objects. In such cases we use one sort of thing as a surrogate in our 
thinking about another, and so I shall call this surrogative reasoning” (p. 449, 
emphasis original). 
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2  It is common in the literature to depict the mapping or mirroring relations in terms 
of isomorphism. However, current examples in neurocomputational theories of 
cognition appeal to highly abstract structure-preserving mapping relations that are 
considerably weaker than isomorphism (see Neander 2017, p. 176; see also 
Gładziejewski 2016; Morgan 2014). For our purposes, we can remain neutral with 
respect to this discussion. We will speak more generally and inclusively of 
structural similarities or resemblances (see O’Brien and Opie (2004) and Shea (2013, 
2018) for a technical and detailed analysis of these notions). 
 
3  It is not obvious that place cells constitute a Cartesian coordinate system.  For 
example, Bechtel (2016) has argued that “[w]hereas in a cartographic map the 
spatial locations between representations correspond, albeit only approximately 
and with distortions, to the spatial relations between the places represented, this is 
not true of the map realized in place cells” (p. 1297, emphasis added). Shea (2014) 
raises similar doubts, observing that “[t]he mechanism depends on place cell firing 
correlating reliably with location, but not on any relation between different place 
cells, nor on spatial relation between locations” (p. 126, emphasis added).  
 
4  “Explanations that invoke S-representations should thus be construed as causal 
explanations that feature facts regarding similarity as an explanans and success or 
failure as an explanandum. To exploit structural similarity in this sense is to use a 
strategy whose success is causally dependent on structural similarity between the 
representational vehicle and what is represented” (Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 
2017, p. 340, emphasis added).  
 
5  The relationship between similarity and success is not a straightforward one. 
Consider a cartographic map. A cartographic map does not fully replicate the 
terrain it is meant to represent. On the contrary, it simplifies it – only including 
elements that are relevant for the function it was designed to achieve. A map that 
resembles its target too much would become excessively complex and thus useless. 
The same rationale applies to S-representations. As Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 
(2017) note, “too much similarity can render the S-representation inefficient at 
serving its purpose” (p. 344).  
 
6  In order to recognize the scope of the job description challenge it is important to 
mention that it does not just trouble S-repesentational theories in cognitive 
neurosenience. Instead, serious worries have been raised in its wake about the 
tenability of classical cognitivist’s conjecture that cognition is rooted in digital 
computation. For, even if cognition proves to be digitally instantiated, there are 
deeper unanswered puzzles about how representational contents could be causally 
efficacious, rather than being systematically screened off from playing any causal 
explanatory role.  
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7  Accordingly, something only counts as a mental representation if it is “used to 
represent a … target as being a certain way that it might or might not be” (Neander 
2017, p. 35; Rescorla 2016).  
 
8  As Thomson and Piccinini (2018) present it, the received view is that “[f]or 
something to count as a representation, it must have a semantic content (e.g., ‘‘there 
is yogurt in the fridge’’) and an appropriate functional role (e.g., to guide behavior 
with respect to the yogurt in the fridge)” (p. 193).  
 
9  Invoking the much-discussed example of the thermostat, O’Brien seeks to 
demonstrate “the causal efficacy of content fixed by resemblance” (2015a, p. 9). As 
he tells us, the thermostat’s functioning is causally driven by the structural 
similarity holding between the curvature of the bi-metallic strip and the 
temperature of the room. Thus, if it is assumed that structural similarities are 
intrinsically contentful it would follow that representational contents can be 
causally efficacious of behavior.  
 
10  Another, related, objection has to do with the fact that structural similarities, unlike 
representations, are symmetrical. A map structurally mirrors the layout of a city as 
much as the city structurally mirrors the layout of the map. If that is the case, S-
representationalists have to conclude that the city represents the map too. To solve 
this problem, a number of authors have suggested to rethink the representation 
relation as a triadic relation, this is, as a relation that involves not only the 
representational state and its target, but also a representational user or consumer 
(Millikan 1984; O’Brien 2015a). With this condition at hand, we can now say that 
what makes the map a representation of the city, and not the other way around, is 
the fact that the map is being used or consumed as such by a cognitive agent or 
system.  
  
11  O’Brien (2015a, 2015b; see also O’Brien and Opie 2015) proposes a similar solution 
to the content-specificity problem, putting emphasis on the interpretive activity of 
users. According to this idea, an S-representational state R of a system S is a 
representation of T if S’s responses to T are causally mediated by R. As he writes, 
“the behavioural dispositions of the system restrict the represented domain to [T], 
and the second-order resemblance relations determine what [features of T] each 
vehicle represents” (O’Brien 2015a, p. 11). 
 
12  Ramsey (2016) holds that a neural state R is a representation of T if T caused R to 
come about and acquire the structure it has. Thus, if a particular S-representation 
“was developed in an effort to learn how to navigate a specific maze, then it is that 
particular maze that is the target [of this S-representation]” (p. 7). Accordingly, in 
such cases, S-representational content is not fixed by structural similarity relations 
 36 
                                                                                                                                            
solely, it is also fixed by the relevant causal relations that brought the S-
representational vehicle into existence. 
 
13  As Lee (2018) explains, “x bears natural information about y, iff x reliably covaries 
with y. In this case, x’s bearing information about y is dependent on a direct physical 
relationship. By contrast, x bears non-natural information about y iff x stands-in for 
y, where x’s tokening does not entail the truth of y. In this instance, x’s bearing 
information about y is not dependent on any direct physical relationship” (p. 8). 
 
14  There is a tendency in the current literature to attempt to deflate the mainstream 
notion of mental representation. Egan (forthcoming) has suggested that we can treat 
representational content as an explanatory gloss. She proposes this maneuver as a 
way of retaining the notion of mental representation in the cognitive sciences while 
avoiding the seemingly intractable problem of providing a naturalistic explanation 
for the origin of representational contents. For detailed discussions of this kind of 
deflationary move see Ramsey (forthcoming) and Hutto and Myin (2018). 
  
15  Interestingly, Jacobson justifies this idea by directly appealing to the explanatory 
role of similarity in cognitive neuroscience. As she writes: “With the rise of 
representational similarity and their elaboration of what representation in 
neuroscience amounts to, there seems no doubt now that cognitive neuroscientists 
have in mind a very different notion of representation … cognitive neuroscience is 
not employing contentful representations” (2015, p. 3). 
 
16  As Shea (2018) explains, “the remarkable discovery of the location-specific 
sensitivity of place cells does not, by itself, show that rats have a cognitive map” (p. 
115). 
 
17  For their experiment, Pfeiffer and Foster (2013) recorded the activity of 250 place 
cells at short time scales (circa 20 ms). The sequences or sweeps measured by Pfeiffer 
and Foster occur during sharp-wave-ripple (SWR) events—this is, irregular burst 
of brief (100-200 ms) high-frequency (140-200 Hz) neuronal activity. Place cell 
sweeps during SWR events are traditionally associated to processes of memory 
consolidation during sleep. 
 
18  Another, related, issue has to do with the relation between the discoveries of Pfeiffer 
and Foster (2013) and the ones of Johnson and Redish (2007). Schmidt and Redish 
(2013) ask: “what is the relation between these two planning phenomena? Does one 
negate the need for the other?” (p. 43) 
 
19  There is a growing literature in cognitive neuroscience that holds that a non-
representational reading of forward-oriented neural activity is feasible. According 
to these views, it is possible to understand the contribution of the future-oriented 
 37 
                                                                                                                                            
neural activity to the system’s behaviour without assuming that this neural activity 
represents future events (see, e.g., Kirchhoff and Robertson 2018; Gallagher 2017; 
Stepp et al. 2011).  
